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SECURITIES-EFFECT OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACTS ON SALES 
OF ENCUMBERED VEHICLES TO PURCHASERS IN ORDINARY COURSE-
Motor vehicle registrations in 1954 totaled 57,876,000.1 In the years 
1950 to 1954 there were factory sa~es of more than five million ve-
hicles annually.2 From the time it leaves the assembly line until its 
useful life is ended, each of these vehicles is a potential source of 
civil litigation or criminal prosecution involving almost every as-
pect of the law. This comment is concerned with the portion of the 
law of chattel securities pertaining to the· determination of rights 
between the purchaser of an automobile in the ordinary course of 
trade3 and the lender who :finances the dealer from whom it was 
purchased.4 Litigation may arise either as to new or used vehicles, 
and sometimes the results may vary depending upon which type is 
involved. The typical case arises after the dealer has become an 
unprofitable subject of suit by either party and, alternatively, 
either the creditor seeks to assert his security interest against the 
purchaser or the purchaser seeks to compel delivery of the title to 
him by the mortgagee, who, in accordance with general provisions 
of most certificate of title statutes, holds it as the first lienor.6 
To settle the issue thus raised, reference must be made to 
statutory provisions for registration of automobiles and certificates 
of title, and to the recording acts which require filing of security 
instruments for personal property. The primary purpose of this 
1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL .ABs-rRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES, 76th ed., 551 
(1955). This figure includes both automobiles and trucks, but excludes publicly owned 
vehicles. 
2lbid. 
8 For the purposes of this comment the definition of a purchaser as a "buyer in the 
ordinary course of trade" will be adopted. See the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 9A U.L.A. 
§1, p. 284 (1951). 
4 No attempt will be made to discuss the impact of certificate of title legislation on 
other litigious problems, such as attachment, artisan's liens, insurable interests, or tort lia-
bility. Nor will there be any attempt to deal with the conflict of laws problems which 
may arise under such legislation. For a detailed discussion of the conflicts problem, see 
Leary, "Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles," 96 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 455 
(1948). 
5 The use of the terms lienor or mortgagee herein refers to those creditors whose in-
terest is secured by a chattel mortgage, conditional sale or any other encumbrance, except 
those which depend upon possession. Corresponding use of the terms lien or mortgage is 
also made. 
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comment will be to examine the various legislative schemes in use 
and the bearing of the certificate of title acts on the case of mort-
gagee v. purchaser in ordinary course. 
I. Origin of the Acts and Source of the Problem 
Early registration statutes were passed for the purpose of identi-
fication and owner regulation and with no intention of altering 
existing property law.6 In time, annual registration was found to 
be a convenient method of assessing personal property taxes on 
motor vehicles.7 The tremendous increase in automobile registra-
tion in the ten-year period from 1915 to 19258 was accompanied 
by a corresponding rise in automobile thefts. In an effort to curb 
these thefts, some legislatures sought to attach property incidents 
to their registration certificates, while others adopted separate in-
struments to serve as documentary evidence of ownership, the 
registration certificate continuing to be, in effect, an annual tax 
receipt.9 Although the separate certificates of title were intended 
as an anti-theft device,10 it seems natural that it occurred to the 
legislators to use them to indicate all ownership interests. For in-
stance, the Michigan statutes, the earliest of the acts, provided for 
notation of liens and encumbrances on the certificate.11 However, 
there was no expression of intent that this latter requirement 
should supersede existing laws pertaining to the registry of en-
cumbrances on personalty. Even though provision was made for 
the notation of liens, the problem of where to record remained. It 
was recognized in some states that, although local recording was 
perfectly suitable for real property and acceptable for infrequently 
moved chattels, it was not the solution for a highly mobile chattel 
such as a motor vehicle.12 Recognition of this fact led to statutes 
providing for exclusive and centralized recording of liens,13 usually 
6 Lusk, "Effect of Registration and Certificate of Title Acts on the Ownership of 
Motor Vehicles," in INDIANA BUSINESS STUDIES, No. 21, p. 8 (1941). 
7Id. at 12. 
s BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES, 76th ed., 551 
(1955). During this period registrations increased from two and one-half million to nearly 
twenty million. 
9 Lusk, "Effect of Registration and Certificate of Title Acts on the Ownership of Motor 
Vehicles," in INDIANA BusINESS STUDIES, No. 21, pp. 13-18 (1941). 
10 The original act adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was known 
as the Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act. Adopted in 1926, the act provided for 
notation of liens on a certificate of title but had no provision for notice to be imparted 
thereby. The act was withdrawn by the commissioners in 1943, after being adopted by 
only nine states. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS 69, 150 (1943). 
11 Mich. Acts (1921), No. 46, §§2, 3. 
12 See 1 DURFEE, CAsES ON SECURITY 510 (1951). 
13 See note 44 infra. 
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with the secretary of state or with a specially created motor vehicle 
department.14 Other jurisdictions followed the pattern of the Mich-
igan act and provided for notation of the liens on the certificate 
while retaining the local recording provisions for automobile 
liens.15 The remainder of the jurisdictions require only registration 
and have made no provision for certificates of title.16 
The introduction of the certificate of title brought a new factor 
into the classic conflict· between the purchaser in ordinary course 
and the mortgagee who has left the encumbered goods with a mort-
gagor engaged in the sale of such goods. In general, a purchaser 
of a chattel other than a motor vehicle is protected against the 
claim of such a mortgagee on theories of agency, estoppel and 
waiver.17 All that is required to complete a sale in the usual situ-
ation is delivery of possession. However, in a certificate of title 
jurisdiction, when an automobile is involved, it is generally pro- . 
vided that the certificate of title be transferred at the time of sale to 
validate the transaction.18 This requirement, together with the 
further requirement that liens must be noted on the certificate of 
title, suggests that the result reached in a general sales situation 
should be varied in the certificate of title jurisdictions on the· 
ground that one receiving the certificate should be warned of the 
dealer's lack of perfect title. · Also raised is the related problem of 
whether possession of the certificate by the mortgagee in accord-
ance with the provisions of most statutes19 should afford the mort-
14 In Montana this duty is performed by the warden at the state penitentiary. Mont. 
Rev. Code Ann. (1954) tit. 53,. §53-101. 
15 See note 24 infra. 
16 See note 20 infra. 
17 See, generally, 2 JONES, CHATIEL MORTGAGES AND CONDffiONAL SALES, Bowers ed., 
§§422, 458, 466 (1933); 2, 3 WILLISTON, SALES, rev. ed., §§312-323, 516 (1948). See also 136 
A.L.R. 821 (1942). The draftsmen of the various uniform statutes have been particularly 
concerned with the protection on the purchaser in ordinary course against liens on the 
stock in trade of a recognized dealer in goods and the various acts are unanimous in grant-
ing such protection. See Uniform Sales Act, 1 U.L.A. (1950) §23 (I); Uniform Conditional 
Sales Act, 2 U.L.A. (1922; Supp. 1955) §9, p. 62; Uniform Trust Receipts Act, 9A U.L.A. 
(1951); §9, p. 303; Uniform Commercial Code (1952) §9-307. 
18 For example, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §8-135 (c) (6), makes assignments 
without transfer of the certificate of title fraudulent and void. On the validity of a trans-
action without a transfer of the certificate of title, see 36 MINN. L. REv. 77 ai: 78 (1951). 
19 Delivery of the certificate in the following jurisdictions is made to the lienor or the 
person indicated, with implications or expressions from other provisions that such person 
may be the lienor: Alaska Sess. Laws (1953) c. 73, §5 (7); Ark. Stat. (1947; Supp. 1951) 
§75-139 (e); Cal. Veh. Code Ann. (Deering, 1948; Supp. 1955) §197 (mortgagee registered 
as legal owner); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) c. 13, §13-6-23; D.C. Code (1952) tit. 40, 
§40-708; Fla. Stat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1954) §319.24(2); Idaho Code (1948) §49-406; III. 
Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 95½, §78 (a) (delivery to person designated); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 
1952; Supp. 1955) §47-2501; Iowa Code (1954) §321.24; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 
1949) §8-135 (c) (I) (delivery to applicant); La. Rev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1954) tit. 32, §708A; 
Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Supp. 1952) §257.222 (c) (delivery to applicant); Mo. Rev. Stat. 
(1952) §301-190 (2) (delivery to applicant); Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952) §60-107; Nev. Comp. 
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gagee protection against a purchaser who negligently or inadvert-
ently fails to obtain the certific!lte at the time of sale. Unhappily, 
no certain or uniform answers to these questions can be given. 
The problem is essentially one involving the placement of the risk, 
the solution often resting on principles of notice. Whether protec-
tion is to be given to the purchaser or to the dealer's mortgagee de-
pends upon the various legislative provisions and the interpreta-
tions given them by the courts, particularly as they bear on the 
question of notice. 
II. The Legislative Schemes 
A. The Registration Jurisdictions. All of the American juris-
dictions require annual registration of automobiles. Thirteen 
states20 and Hawaii21 provide for no other title instrument. In 
none of these fourteen jurisdictions is there any provision for nota-
tion of liens on the registration certifi.cate.22 Thus the problem of 
the effect of such notation in a dispute between a purchaser and 
Laws (Hillyer, 1929; Supp. 1943-1949) §4435.14d (mortgagee registered as legal owner); 
6 N.J. Sess. Laws (1955) c. 209 (original to holder of encumbrance, copy to mortgagor); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1955) c. 64, §64-4-1 (owner to assign on transfer of interest); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §20-57 (f); N.D. Laws (1951) c. 250 (distinction made between legal 
and registered owner, certificate issued to legal owner); Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953; 
Supp. 1955) §4505.08; Okla. Stat. (1951; Supp. 1955) tit. 47, §23.3 (delivery to applicant); 
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 481, §481.410 (l); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953) tit. 75, §33; 
S.D. Code (1939; Supp. 1952) tit. 44, §44.0203; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934; Supp. 
1952) §5538.135 (d); Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1953) art. 1436-1, §31; Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) tit. 41, §41-1-39; Va. Code (1950) tit. 46, §46-74; Wash. Rev. Code (1953) tit. 46, 
§46.12.170. In the following delivery is made as indicated: Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) 
§66-231 (c) (to the mortgagee by implication); Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 21, §2306 (c) (to 
the registered owner with option to the mortgagee); Maryland has no provision for delivery 
of certificate of title. Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1952) art. 66½, §23, provides for applica-
tion for registration and certificate of title but §27 only provides for issuance of the regis-
tration certificate; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947; Supp. 1955) tit. 53, §53-107 (certificate of 
ownership must be surrendered to person entitled to possess and operate). Delivery to the 
owner is required in the following cases, with the implication that the registered owner is 
intended: W.Va. Code (1955) §1721 (130); Wis. Stat. (1953) c. 85, §85.01 (3); Wyo. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. (1946; Supp. 1955) §60-207. 
20 Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mis• 
sissippi, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Vermont. 
21 Technically, this statement is untrue as it pertains to Hawaii. Hawaii Rev. Laws 
(1945) c. 138, §§7340, 7342, provide for a certificate of ownership as well as a certificate of 
registration, with requirements that the certificate of ownership be issued to the legal 
owner. No provision is made for the notation of liens on the certificate of ownership, how-
ever. Section 12758 of the chattel mortgage statute provides that a mortgage othenvise 
void because unrecorded shall not be so in the case of a mortgagee or transferee of a 
motor vehicle who is registered as legal owner. Hawaii Rev. Laws (1945) c. 308, §12758. 
Hawaii has thus attempted to perfect the certificate of ownership as a security device by 
giving protection to the physical holder of the certificate. 
22 Ga. Code Ann. (1937; Supp. 1954) tit. 68, §68-207, requires that a sworn statement 
regarding liens be made when an assignment is made of the registration. I Ga. Laws 
(1955), No. 204, struck out a previous requirement in tit. 68, §68-205, that a statement of 
liens accompany an application for registration. 
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the dealer's mortgagee would not arise in these jurisdictions. In 
a contest involving priority betwee~ a holder of a recorded chattel 
mortgage and a purchaser in ordinary course, local interpretations 
of personal property law involving chattel mortgages, conditional 
sales and other encumbrances would be applicable.23 
B. States in Which Lien Notation Does Not Impart Con-
structive Notice. Because transfer of a certificate of title is a 
general requirement where used cars are concerned, it is conven-
ient to consider the operation of the statutes where such vehicles 
are involved prior to a consideration of the problem as it relates 
to new vehicles. The majority of jurisdictions have statutory pro-
visions requiring the acquisition of a certificate of title24 in addi-
tion to compliance with the registry requirements. Indeed, the 
acquisition of a certificate of title is generally a prerequisite to 
obtaining a registration certificate in all certificate of title states. In 
fifteen states25 it is expressly or impliedly26 required that notation 
of liens be made on the certificate of title, but in none of these 
states is it provided that constructive notice is imparted by such 
notation.27 Many of these states have declared that the notation 
provisions do not supersede the general chattel mortgage recording 
23 It would be remiss not to mention that one of the most satisfactory solutions of the 
problem under consideration has been achieved in a state falling within this group. 32 
N.Y. Consol Laws (McKinney, 1940; Supp. 1955) §230c. This section establishes a dealer 
mortgage system which provides protection to a mortgagee against other creditors and 
lienors, but specifically provides that buyers in the ordinary course of trade shall take 
free and clear of mortgages. Compare the earlier position of the buyer in New York as 
shown by Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Decker, 244 N.Y. 340, 155 N.E. 665 (1927). See 
136 A.L.R. 821 (1942), for other decisions in these states. 
24 Certificates of title are generally issued for the life of an automobile or until the 
owner transfers all or part of his interest, at which time a new certificate is issued. Regis-
tration certificates are renewed annually. 
25 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tiL 21, §2302; Ill. Rev. StaL (1955) c. 95½, §78; Ind. Stat. 
Ann. (Bums, 1952; Supp. 1955) §47-2501; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949; Supp. 
1953) §8-129 as amended by Kan. Laws (1955), c. 45, p. 137; Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1952) 
art. 66½, §21; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Supp. 1952) §257.216; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1940; 
Supp. 1954) §39:10-11 as amended by 6 N.J. Sess. Laws (1955), c. 209; N.C. Gen. Stat. 
(1953; Supp. 1955) §20-50; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) tit. 39, §39-0504; Okla. Stat. (1951; 
Supp. 1955) tit. 47, §23.3; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 481, §481.110; Wash. Rev. Code (1953) 
tit. 46, §46.12.010; W.Va. Code (1955) §1721 (119); Wis. Stat. (1953) c. 85, §85.01; Wyo. 
Comp. Stat. Ann. (1946; Supp. 1955) §60-203. 
26 Ore. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 481, §481.115, declares the contents of the certificate are to 
contain such information as the department deems proper, together with the name of the 
owner and legal owner. Subsequent sections indicate that notation of liens is to be made 
thereon. E.g., §§481.405, 481.410. 
27 The Texas certificate of title act [Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1953) art. 1436-1] has 
no provision making compliance the exclusive method of recording, nor is constructive 
notice expressly imparted. This statute has been construed to be the exclusive method of 
filing. Higgins v. Robertson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 210 S.W. (2d) 250. For this reason, 
Texas is not included among the states in the group in which constructive notice is not 
imparted by notation of liens on the certificate of title. 
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requirements, while in the remainder the question of whether the 
certificate of title act impliedly repeals the general recording acts 
is unanswered.28 It seems advisable, however, in light of the de-
cisions holding the general recording statutes not to have been 
superseded, that all security instruments be recorded with the ap-
propriate county or city officer before notation on the certificate 
of title is accomplished. It is then incumbent upon the mortgagee 
to have the local officer make the appropriate notation, or the 
mortgagee must forward a copy of the mortgage29 or other instru-
ment to the motor vehicle department or similar office for notation 
at the state level.30 In all of these states, except one,31 transfer of 
possession of the automobile must be accompanied by the "endorse-
ment of an assignment and warranty of title with a statement of all 
liens and encumbrances"32 on an appropriate place in the certifi-
cate of title. Inasmuch as the transfer of the certificate is thus 
necessary to validate the transaction, it would appear to matter 
little whether constructive notice is imparted, since the purchaser 
would have actual notice of any liens noted thereon, assuming he 
28 Delaware: Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 21, §2306, indicates that local filing shall not 
constitute notice until notation is made on the certificate of title. Illinois: In American 
States Ins. Co. v. White, 341 Ill. App. 422, 94 N.E. (2d) 95 (1950), it was held that the 
Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act was not a recording act. Indiana: the chattel 
mortgage recording act [Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951) §51-501 (k)J expressly includes motor 
vehicles. Kansas: see note 33 infra. Maryland: no state decisions, although federal courts 
have held that the registration (which includes notation on a .certificate of title) does not 
take the place of recording required by the chattel mortgage act. In re Rosen, (D.C. Md. 
1928) 23 F. (2d) 687. Michigan: In Nelson v. Viergiver, 230 Mich. 38, 203 N.W. 164 (1925), 
it was held that the chattel mortgage act was not superseded by the certificate of title act. 
In addition, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Supp. 1952) §257.238 (a), requires an affidavit of 
local filing before notation is made on the certificate. New Jersey: 6 N.J. Sess. Laws (1955), 
c. 209, requires dual filing. North Carolina: In Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor 
Co., 190 N.C. 157, 129 S.E. 414 (1925), it was held that the mortgage registration statute 
was not affected or repealed by the certificate of title notation provisions. The certificate 
of title act was held to be a police regulation measure only. North Dakota: no decisions. 
Oklahoma: In King Godfrey, Inc. v. Rogers, 157 Okla. 216, II P. (2d) 935 (1932), it was 
held that the certificate of title provisions do not supersede the chattel mortgage filing 
provisions. Oregon: no decisions. Commercial Finance Corp. v. Burke, 173 Ore. 341, 145 P. 
(2d) 473 (1944), indicates that it is apparently the custom to record locally despite the 
notation provisions. Washington: In Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash. 
(2d) 46, 102 P. (2d) 227 (1940), local recording by itself was not sufficient to protect the 
lienor. The court refused to answer the question of whether the notation on certificate 
provisions superseded the general recording provisions. The decision indicates that it 
would be advisable to comply with both acts. West Virginia: no decisions. Wisconsin: 
in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Schneider, 265 Wis. 264, 61 N.W. (2d) 499 (1953), local 
filing was required to validate the lien. Wyoming: no decisions. Steffy v. Teton Truck 
Line Co., 44 Wyo. 345, II P. (2d) 1082 (1932), indicates that local recording is apparently 
the custom. 
29 E.g., Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (1946; Supp. 1955) §60-208 (f). 
30 E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1948; Supp. 1952) §257.217. 
31 W.Va. Code (1955) §1721 (144), allows five days for the certificate to be delivered. 
32 These are words most frequently found in certificate of title acts. See, e.g., N.C. 
Gen. Stat. (1953) §20-72. 
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acquires the title as the law demands. Nevertheless, these statutes 
have received a v_ariety of interpretations. It has been held almost 
uniformly that compliance with the local recording act is necessary, 
but this will not avail the mortgagee unless he has also noted his 
lien on the certificate.33 On the other hand, it has been held that 
notation on the certificate alone is not enough and the failure to 
record locally will invalidate the mortgage as to the purchaser.34 
Even where the double recording has been accomplished the pur-
chaser has been protected in some jurisdictions where he did not 
acquire the title certificate upon purchase.35 Conversely, it has 
been held that compliance with the statutory scheme will protect 
the mortgagee.36 
When new cars are involved, an additional factor complicates 
the situation. In all but three37 of the states in the no-constructive-
notice-by-notation group a dealer is not required to have a title in 
his possession for a new vehicle. The first title on a new car is 
secured either by the purchaser evidencing his ownership with a 
bill of sale or by the dealer on behalf of the purchaser. In such 
a case it would appear that the certificate of title statute should 
have no effect and the purchaser would be protected against the 
mortgagee on the grounds of waiver and estoppel. The new Wis-
consin Factors Act38 also seems broad enough to protect bona fide 
retail purchasers against dealers' mortgagees.39 
Three of the states in this group require manufacturers' certifi-
cates to be in the possession of dealers for all new cars held in 
stock.40 Liens must be noted on these certificates, and it would 
thus appear that actual notice would be given to the new car pur-
33 Kansas decisions appear to hold that the title act supersedes local recording, but no 
case has been found wherein local recording was omitted and notation made pnly on the 
certificate. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 169 Kan. 220, 218 P. (2d) 181 
(1950). 
34 Sayre & Fisher Brick Co. v. Dearden, 23 N.J. Super. 453, 93 A. (2d) 52 (1952); King 
Godfrey, Inc. v. Rogers, 157 Okla. 216, 11 P. (2d) 935 (1932). 
35 Buttinghausen v. Rappeport, 131 N.J. Eq. 252, 24 A. (2d) 877 (1942); Al's Auto 
Sales v. Moskowitz, 203 Okla. 611, 224 P. (2d) 588 (1950); Merchants Rating & Adjusting 
Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash. (2d) 46, 102 P. (2d) 227 (1940). 
36 Bayer v. Jackson City Bank & Trust Co., 335 Mich. 99, 55 N.W. (2d) 746 (1952). The 
report of this case does not disclose whether notation was ever made on the certificate. The 
mortgagee did, however, retain possession of the certificate after accomplishing the local 
recording, and this was enough to perfect the lien. The court imposed a duty on the 
purchaser to acquire the certificate at the time of purchase or be on notice from his seller's 
lack of possession. 
37 Illinois, Indiana, and Maryland. 
38 Wis. Stat. (1953) c. 241, §241.145 (5) (a). 
39 The possible effect of section 16 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act should not be 
ignored where the act is in effect. See 52 MICH. L. REv. 276 (1953). 
40 III. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 95½, §76a; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1952) §47-2503; Md. Code 
Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 66½, §46. · 
1956] COMMENTS 687 
chaser in these three states, assuming compliance with the provi-
sion requiring transfer of the certificate. 
Those no-notice-by-notation type statutes which require double 
recording have been criticized as being without justification,41 and, 
indeed, have created new problems. Where all requirements have 
been complied with and the mortgagee holds the_ title in accord-
ance with the general provisions concerning delivery of the certifi-
cate, 42 the problem to be resolved is whether the failure of the 
purchaser to acquire the certificate should cast the loss on him, or 
whether the actual or implied consent of the mortgagee to the sale 
of the encumbered automobile estops him from asserting his lien. 
C. The Constructive Notice by Notation Jurisdictions. The 
most desirable statutes are those adopted by twenty-one states, 
Alaska, and the District of Columbia. These statutes provide that 
constructive notice is imparted by notation of the lien on the 
certificate of title, by establishing a centralized system of filing 
liens and encumbrances on automobiles and declaring that such 
filing is exclusive of all other recording acts.43 By judicial interpre-
tation, Texas has included itself in this group.44 Under the provi-
sions of these statutes, a copy of the security instrument must ac-
company the application for the certificate of title. Recording and 
indexing is accomplished in a central office.45 Generally, the certifi-
cate with the appropriate notation is issued to the prior lienor.46 
Assuming compliance with the requirements for transfer in these 
jurisdictions, it would appear that an adequate and safe system of 
transfer, at least for used cars, has been established. Nevertheless, 
the same factors noted under the no-notice-by-notation statutes 
come into play where used cars are concerned. Several states have 
held a mortgagee estopped to assert his lien against one who has 
41 Lusk, "Effect of Registration and Certificate of Title Acts on the Ownership of 
Motor Vehicles," in INDIANA BUSINESS SnmIES, No. 21, p. 136 (1941). 
42 See note 19 supra. 
43 Alaska Sess. Laws (1951), c. 124, §§5, 7; Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §66-231; Ark. Stat. 
(1949; Supp. 1951) §75-161; Calif. Veh. Code Ann. (Deering, 1948; Supp. 1955) §§195, 198; 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953) c. 13, §13-6-19; D.C. Code (1952) tit. 40, §40-702; Fla. Stat. 
Ann. (1953; Supp. 1954) §319.23; La. Rev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1954) tit. 32, §7I0A; Mo. 
Rev. Stat. (1949) §443.480; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) tit. 53, §53-110; Neb. Rev. Stat. 
(1952) c. 60, §60-110; Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929; Supp. 1943-1949) §4435.14e; N.M. 
Stat. Ann. (1953) c. 64, §64-5-2; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §4505.13; Pa. Stat. Ann. 
(Purdon, 1953) tit. 75, §33; S.D. Code (1939; Supp. 1952) tit. 44, §44.0203; Tenn. Code 
Ann. (Williams, 1934; Supp. 1952) §5538.169; Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 41, §41-1-87; 
Va. Code (1950) tit. 46, §46-71. 
44 See note 27 supra. See also 1 REP. ArrY. GEN. OF TEX., No. 1539 (1939). 
45 In some states recording is with a local agent of the director with a copy being for-
warded to the central office. E.g., Iowa Code Ann. (1954; Supp. 1955) §321.50. 
46 See note 5 supra. 
688 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
purchased from a dealer-mortgagor with possession of the car (and, 
therefore, with apparent power to sell) even though the purchaser 
himself failed to acquire the certificate as the law commands.47 It 
is significant to note that one of the most recent states to adopt a 
centralized filing system, Louisiana, has amended its act and now 
expressly protects the bona fide retail purchaser from any mortgage 
on a dealer's stock.48 Arkansas specifically provides that dealer 
mortgages shall be valid except as to bona fide retail purchasers.49 
These statutes stand by themselves in this group of states. Almost 
a third of the states in the group expressly provide that no waiver 
or estoppel shall operate in favor of a "~ransferee" who does not 
obtain a certificate of title against a person having possession of 
such a certificate,50 no distinction being made in the case of dealers. 
It should be noted, however, that two of these same states, in addi-
tion to the no-waiver section, specifically provide that exposure for 
sale by the mortgagor with the knowledge of the lienholder shall 
not render the lien ineffective against "creditors" of the mortgagor 
or holders of subsequent liens upon the vehicle.51 In these two stat-
utes no mention is made of "purchasers," thus suggesting that 
estoppel might operate in favor of a purchaser in the proper fact 
situation. In none of the remainder of the states having no-waiver 
statutes is there any indication that "transferees" consist only of 
creditors and junior lienors. The Texas statute does not name 
the parties as to whom there will be no waiver. Rather, it provides 
that a mortgagee's rights shall not be affected by exposure for sale.52 
This broad provision would seem to cover any transferee, whether 
purchaser or creditor. 
As in the case of the no-notice-by-notation states, the foregoing 
statements do not apply with the same validity to new car transfers. 
Although it may be easier for a court to find estoppel in the case 
of an untitled new car than it would be to ignore the title transfer 
47 Siegel v. Bayless, 113 Cal. App. (2d) 661, 248 P. (2d) 968 (1952); Fogle v. General 
Credit, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 45; Rasmussen v. Lee & Co., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P. 
(2d) 119 (1937); Snyder v. Lincoln, 156 Neb. 190, 55 N.W. (2d) 614 (1952); General 
Credit, Inc. v. Winchester, Inc., 196 Va. 711, 85 S.E. (2d) 201 (1955). 
48 La. Rev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1954) tit. 32, §7I0B. See also La. Rev. Stat. (1950; Supp. 
1954) tit. 9, §5354, which extends the provisions of the certificate of title act into the chattel 
mortgage act to protect purchasers in the ordinary course where the chattel mortgage is 
used by dealers and lending agencies. Compare the earlier position of the Louisiana court 
on this matter in Palmisano v. Louisiana Motors Co., 166 La. 416; 117 S. 446 (1928). 
49 Ark. Stat. (1947; Supp. 1951) §51-1007. 
50 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1954) §319.22 (l); Idaho Code (1948) §49-404; Iowa 
Code (1954) §321.45; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952; Supp. 1953) c. 60, §60-105; Ohio Rev. Code 
(Baldwin, 1953; Supp. 1955) §4505.04; S.D. Code (1939; Supp. 1952) tit. 44, §44.0202. 
51 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952) c. 60, §60-110; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §4505.13. 
52 Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1953) art. 1436-1, §45. 
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provisions in the case of a used car, two significant types of statutes 
directly bear on such a possibility. Missouri has expressly exempt-
ed untitled new cars from the certificate of title provisions53 and 
this exemption has been interpreted to give priority to the local 
recording of a lien in the nature of a purchase money mortgage 
on a dealer's new stock as against all transferees, including pur-
chasers.54 Florida has adopted a similar statute, but extends its 
provision to cover used cars as well.55 Six of the states in this 
notice-by-notation group provide for manufacturer's certificates 
on new cars held for first sale.56 It is significant to note that four 
of these states57 are among those previously mentioned as having 
statutes providing that no waiver or estoppel shall operate in favor 
of a transferee who does not obtain a certificate of title. Inasmuch 
as both new and used cars are required to have title certificates, 
the no-waiver provision emphasizes the legislative command that 
passage of the certificate is necessary to validate a transfer of owner-
ship or interest. 
Although shortcomings exist in the centralized filing scheme, 
especially with regard to untitled new cars, the system is decidedly 
superior to other systems and tends toward more certainty than the 
other existing plans. This is true because the elimination of 
double filing provides a more convenient method of affording 
notice and involves less confusion to the purchasing public. 
III. Policy Considerations Bearing on the Mortgagee-
Purchaser Conflict 
Many of the policy arguments concerning the determination of 
rights between the purchaser and mortgagee are illustrated by the 
recent case of General Credit, Inc. v. Winchester, Inc.58 This case 
involved an action brought by a finance company in a notice-by-no-
tation state against a retail purchaser for value without actual 
notice. The court held that the asserted lien was invalid against a 
purchaser without actual knowledge even though the statute pro-
vided that issuance of a certificate of title showing the existence of a 
lien shall be deemed adequate notice that the lien exists. In so hold-
53 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §443.480. 
54 Interstate Securities Co. v. Barton, 236 Mo. App. 325, 153 S.W. (2d) 393 (1941). 
55 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1954) §319.27 (3) (b). 
56 Iowa Code (1954) §321.50; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952) c. 60, §60-103; N.M. Stat. Ann. 
(1953) c. 64, §64-4-5; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §4505.05; S.D. Code (1939; Supp. 
1952) tit. 44, §44.0202 (2); Tex. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1953) art. 1436-1, §§22-23. 
57 Iowa, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota. In addition to these four states, Texas 
provides that exposure for sale shall not affect a mortgagee's rights. See note 52 supra. 
M 196 Va. 711, 85 S.E. (2d) 201 (1955), noted in 41 VA. L. REv. 418 (1955). 
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ing, the court relied on a previous Virginia i:::ase59 involving a simi-
lar conflict in regard to a recorded chattel mortgage which arose 
prior to the passage of the certificate of title act. In the earlier case 
the court had declared that a mortgage on a stock of goods was null 
and void because to uphold such a lien on articles left in the hands 
of a dealer for sale would be to allow dealers' mortgagees to per-
petrate fraud on purchasers. Reiterating this view the court in the 
General Credit case added that, although compliance with the re-
cording requirements was declared to be adequate notice, the prin-
ciple of equitable estoppel does not turn on the adequacy or in-
adequacy of the notice. 60 In addition, the court suggested that to 
find estoppel where an encumbered refrigerator is involved and 
not to find it in the case of a motor vehicle would lead to an in-
congruous and inequitable result which could not have been in-
tended by the legislature. The dissent argued that, having done 
all the law requires to perfect a lien, the mortgagee should be pro-
tected. 61 
Another argument frequently advanced against the protection 
of lienors relying on compliance with the statutory provisions is 
that it is common knowledge in sales of automobiles that dealers 
frequently take care of title transfers and registration, often com-
pleting these matters after receipt of payment and delivery of the 
automobile.62 A purchaser is thus lulled into a false sense of se-
curity by a force put in motion by tlie mortgagee. This argument 
is frequently coupled with the objection that excessive delay in 
commercial transactions would result if a search were required of 
all the pertinent records involved in every sale of hard goods. 63 
It is not likely that the system of centralized filing used for auto-
mobiles in some jurisdictions will be extended to these other types 
of hard goods. It is the very mobility of the automobile which has 
led to the introduction of certificates of title for them. The at-
59 Boice v. Finance & Guaranty Corp., 127 Va. 563, 102 S.E. 591 (1920). 
60 General Credit v. Winchester, Inc., 196 Va. 711 at 718, 85 S.E. (2d) 201 (1955). In 
this case the Virginia court may have decided more than was necessary to dispose of the 
issues in a manner favorable to the purchaser. Va. Code (1950) tit. 46, §46-106, is the only 
statutory provision of its kind and has the effect of making acquisition of certificates of 
title for new vehicles in a dealer's stock optional. Inasmuch as there is no mandatory 
requirement that a new automobile be titled, the purchaser conceivably would be under 
no duty to request such a title upon purchase of a new vehicle and could rely on appear-
ances resulting from the dealer's possession and display of the automobile. The court 
could then have applied ordinary doctrines of estoppel or waiver. 
61 General Credit, Inc. v. Winchester, Inc., 196 Va. 7II at 721, 85 S.E. (2d) 201 (1955). 
62Fogle v. General Credit, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 45 at 50. 
63 See 1 DURFEE, CAsF.S ON SECURITY 530 (1951). See also 36 MINN. L. REv. 77 at 82 
(1951), suggesting that, in Minnesota, at least, a search for a lien on an automobile would 
necessitate a search of the records in every county and first class city in the state. 
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tempt to perfect these instruments as a security device by giving 
protection to one indicating his interest thereon or possibly main-
taining physical possession of it has created the problem of con-
flicting interests in the struggle between lending agencies and pur-
chasers. Given the absence of any need for certificates of title for 
other hard goods, it is doubtful that the contest between lienor 
and purchaser, as opposed to other types of transferees, would arise. 
IV. Other Legislative Solutions and Suggestions 
The ultimate solution to the difficult problem of whether to 
favor mortgagees or protect purchasers lies in deciding where to 
impose the risk of loss. Once this question has been decided, the 
goal then becomes one of making this decision known to the affect-
ed public. Beyond this, there is something to be said for uniform-
ity a}Ilong the states to take care of the occasional out-of-state pur-
chaser or person who has recently moved from a state applying a 
rule contrary to that of his new residence. There seems little like-
lihood of adopting a national centralized recording plan such as 
has been achieved for aircraft64 although the adoption of such a 
plan for automobiles would give greater certainty. The Uniform 
Trust Receipts Act65 which has been adopted in many jurisdic-
tions66 bears on the problem and would protect the purchaser in 
ordinary course in the usual case.67 The clearest solution, should 
the policy decision be reconciled in favor of the purchaser, would 
be the adoption of a statute similar to the Uniform Motor Vehicle 
Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act68 adopted by the Com-
64 52 Stat. L. 1006 (1938), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §523, establishes a national recording system 
for security instruments concerning aircraft. 52 Stat. L. 1005 (1938), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §521, 
provides that the terms of the act shall pertain to all civil, state, and federal aircraft 
excepting aircraft of the defense forces registered by their own department. 
65 9A U.L.A. §§1 to 22, p. 274 et seq. (1951). 
66 The Uniform Trust Receipts Act had been adopted in 33 jurisdictions as of De-
cember 1, 1954: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, '\Vashington, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS 227 (1954). 
67 See 52 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 276 at 286 (1953), for a persuasive argument that §16 
of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act was intended to protect the purchaser in ordinary 
course in the situation herein considered even though the financing agency had not used 
the trust receipt method of financing. 
68 This act was approve<;! for adoption at the Annual Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, August 15-20, 1955. The handbook of the Conference has not 
been published as of this writing. The provision of the act pertinent to the matter under 
consideration is found in §3, which provides: "This act does not apply to or affect: .•• 
(c) a security interest in a vehicle created by a manufacturer or dealer who holds the 
vehicle for sale [ , but a buyer in the ordinary course of trade from the manufacturer or 
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missioners on Uniform State Laws. This act provides a centralized 
filing plan but specifically excludes dealers and manufacturers 
from the benefit of notice given by notation of liens on the certifi-
cate of title. 
Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code would have no 
bearing on the problem under consideration.69 
V. Conclusions 
The present conglomeration of certificate of title acts, although 
locally successful in some instances, is unsatisfactory when consider-
ed as a whole. The attempt to perfect these instruments as a se-
curity device has led to confusing and contradictory policies. One 
policy would emphasize education of the purchasing public to the 
necessity of acquiring a certificate of title in all cases before paying 
for an automobile. The other treats the case of mortgagee v. pur-
chaser in ordinary course as basically a problem of credit risk and 
places that risk on the finance company as a cost of doing business. 
That cost, it is argued, can be spread on those dealers taking advan-
tage of the extension of credit. If the former policy is to be adopted 
in a given jurisdiction, it can be accomplished simply. The pur-
chase of an automobile is generally an important event and the 
traffic of title searchers at the filing agency is not so great that it 
would be inconvenient to require one to ascertain who really 
owns that which it is his intent to buy. On the other hand, if the 
policy chosen is that which imposes the loss on the finance com-
panies, there would be adequate judicial and legislative support 
for such a decision; most of the uniform acts dealing with business 
transactions tend to offer protection to the purchaser in ordinary 
course. Further than this, both the form of business organization 
and the resources common to most credit agencies allow them to 
absorb losses much more easily than the individual automobile pur-
chaser. Under this general policy, any reward to the finance com-
panies for statutory compliance would be limited to protection 
against other creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. Unfortun-
ately, there appears to be no legislative trend toward protection of 
dealer takes free of the security interest]." A comment suggests that a state permitting 
a security interest created by a manufacturer or dealer to be superior to the rights of a 
buyer in the ordinary course of trade should enact the language in brackets. 
69 The Uniform Commercial Code (1952) §9-302 (2), makes the filing provisions of the 
code inapplicable where a statute provides for indicating security interests on a certificate 
of title. To date only Pennsylvania has adopted the code, and the comment in Pa. Stat. 
Ann. (Purdon, 1952) tit. 12A, at p. 298, indicates that ambiguities from the past have been 
carried over into it. 
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either party-acts favoring the purchaser being offset by acts provid-
ing that no waiver shall operate against a lienor who has complied 
with the certificate of title act-but the judicial interpretations 
tend toward protection of the consumer. Until the statutes are 
clarified so as to accord with one or the other policy, the most 
courageous judicial approach is to treat the dispute between pur-
chaser and lender as, essentially, one of credit risk and to hold that 
this risk should be borne at the financing level. 
Charles G. Williamson, Jr., S.Ed. 
